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Abstract 
Democracy is under threat globally from democratically elected leaders engaging in erosion 
of media freedom, civil society, and the rule of law. What distinguishes democracies that 
prevail against the forces of autocratization? This article breaks new ground by 
conceptualizing democratic resilience as a two-stage process, whereby democracies first 
exhibit resilience by avoiding autocratization altogether and second, by avoiding democratic 
breakdown given that autocratization has occurred. To model this two-stage process, we 
introduce the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset tracking autocratization 
since 1900. These data demonstrate the extraordinary nature of the current wave of 
autocratization:  Fifty-nine (61%) episodes of democratic regression in the ERT began after 
1992. Since then, autocratization episodes have killed an unprecedented 36 democratic 
regimes. Using a selection-model, we simultaneously test for factors that make democracies 
more prone to experience democratic regression and, given this, factors that explain 
democratic breakdown. Results from the explanatory analysis suggest that constraints on the 
executive are positively associated with a reduced risk of autocratization. Once 
autocratization is ongoing, we find that a long history of democratic institutions, durable 
judicial constraints on the executive, and more democratic neighbours are factors that make 
democracy more likely to prevail.
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Introduction 
Democracy is under threat globally. Over 20% of the world’s polities and one-third of the 
global population are now experiencing substantial and sustained declines in democracy.2 As 
this article demonstrates, democracies are particularly vulnerable during this “third wave” of 
autocratization.3 Of the 96 episodes of autocratization within democracies between 1900 and 
2019, 59 (61%) began after 1992. Since then, autocratization has killed an unprecedented 36 
democratic regimes, causing over 700 million people to lose access to democratic institutions. 
Rather than employing blatant and unconstitutional means (e.g. military or self-coups),4 
democratically elected leaders increasingly engage in more subtle and nuanced attacks on 
democratic institutions and practices, such as executive aggrandizement,5 curtailment of 
media freedoms,6 and the gradual erosion of horizontal accountability.7 Freedom of 
expression and civil society are typically affected first and the most.8 
What distinguishes democracies that prevail against a global wave of autocratization 
from those that do not? Our object of inquiry is democratic resilience – the capacity to 
prevent substantial regression in the quality of democratic institutions and practices.9 
Democratic resilience takes two forms. Democracies can prevent autocratization altogether, 
meaning they never experience a substantial or sustained decline in democratic qualities (such 
as New Zealand and Sweden). Alternatively, democracies may experience an episode of 
autocratization but pro-democracy actors and institutions manage to change the course and 
avert democratic breakdown (such as South Korea from 2008–2016, and Benin from 2007–
2012). 
These two forms of democratic resilience are conceptually and empirically distinct. 
For democracies, episodes of autocratization are uncommon. We find only 96 such episodes 
in 70 polities from 1900 to 2019. This suggests that a given democratic country-year exhibits 
an overall high resilience, all else equal. However, once a democracy enters an autocratization 
episode, democratic resilience becomes unlikely. A mere 19 episodes of democratic regression 
managed to avert breakdown. Thus, democratic resilience manifests as a two-stage 
                                                     
2 Maerz et al., “State of the world 2019: Autocratization Surges - Resistance Grows.” 
3 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?” 
4 Svolik, “Which democracies will last? Coups, incumbent takeovers, and the dynamic of democratic 
consolidation.” 
5 Bermeo, “On democratic backsliding.” 
6 Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg, “How much democratic backsliding?” 
7 Coppedge, “Eroding regimes: What, where, and when?” 
8 Maerz et al., “State of the world 2019: Autocratization Surges - Resistance Grows.” 
9 This builds on concepts of democratic durability and resilience as defined by Burnell and Calvert, “The 
resilience of democracy: An introduction.” 
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phenomenon, where some democracies show resilience by avoiding autocratization 
altogether, and others, after having “selected into” an episode of autocratization, prevail by 
averting breakdown. 
Existing studies typically address this two-stage process by modelling democratic 
breakdown as a discrete outcome, ignoring potentially important selection effects in the 
process.10 Alternatively, building on Lührmann and Lindberg,11 we take an episodes approach 
that treats autocratization as a process. To do so, we use the V-Dem data12 to develop the 
Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, covering democratization and 
autocratization episodes in most political units from 1900 to 2019.13 The episode approach 
enables us to empirically model the two-stage process of democratic resilience using a 
Heckman selection model. In the first “selection” stage model, we assess which factors are 
associated with resilience to experiencing an autocratization episode. In the second 
“outcome” stage, we analyse what factors are associated with resilience to democratic 
breakdown, conditional on being in an episode of democratic regression.  
We offer several novel insights into democratic resilience. First, our data provides the 
most comprehensive coverage of autocratization episodes from 1900 to 2019, and for the 
first time, codes subtypes of democratic regression and autocratic regression and outcomes 
of these episodes. This approach generates new information on the scope and nature of 
autocratization. We find that democracies are increasingly susceptible to undergoing 
autocratization and that once autocratization begins, avoiding democratic breakdown is very 
rare. Second, our empirical models suggest that democracies with stronger constraints on the 
executive are both less likely to undergo democratic regression and if they do, they are more 
likely to avert breakdown. High levels of economic development in democracies also reduce 
the probability of experiencing an episode of autocratization. In addition, we find that 
neighbourhood levels of democracy play a crucial role; the breakdown of democracy is less 
likely in regions where democratic institutions are the norm. Finally, countries with a long 
democratic experience are also more resilient to breakdown once democratic regression is 
ongoing. 
                                                     
10 E.g. Svolik, “Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation”; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock, 
“Economic performance, institutional intermediation, and democratic survival”; Alemán and Yang, “A duration 
analysis of democratic transitions and authoritarian backslides” 
11 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?” 
12 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Dataset V10” 
13 Combined with our coding of episodes of democratization, their subtypes, and outcomes, the ERT dataset 
provides a useful new tool for scholars to explore regime transformation since 1900. Maerz et al., “Vdemdata – 
and R package to load, explore and work with the most recent V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) dataset”; Edgell 
et al. “Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset codebook, v1.0”.  
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Existing insights into democratic resilience 
The literature on democratic breakdown and survival informs much of what we know about 
democratic resilience. Scholars in this field typically test for the effects of structural 
determinants on the probability of democratic survival or breakdown as events.14 
Alternatively, they may look at more incremental regressions (sometimes termed backsliding, 
reversal, or erosion) using annual changes in measures of democracy.15 We focus here on four 
main determinants from the literature: institutional constraints on the executive, economic 
factors, neighbouring regimes, and previous democratic experience. 
Constraints on the executive 
A prominent body of work concerns the “perils of presidentialism”.16 According to Linz, 
separate legislative and executive elections create a dual legitimacy and individual mandate of 
the executive that predisposes political actors to view presidential systems as a zero-sum 
game. This discourages coalitions and a diversity of viewpoints, while concentrating 
substantial powers in one individual.17 In effect, presidential systems are more prone to 
political polarization and deadlock, personalization of politics, and exclusion of losers when 
the winner takes-it-all, thus furthering military coups and other types of breakdown compared 
to parliamentary democracies.18 
Noting that the United States is the only durable presidential democracy,19 several 
large-N studies find a negative relationship between presidentialism and rates of democratic 
survival.20 Case evidence suggests that executives in presidential democracies are likely to 
“rule at the edge of the constitution” because the legislature has limited removal powers.21 In 
                                                     
14.E.g. Svolik, “Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation”; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 
“Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability”; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock, “Economic 
performance, institutional intermediation, and democratic survival” 
15 E.g. Ginsburg and Huq, “How to save a constitutional democracy”; Erdmann, “Transition from Democracy. 
Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Breakdown of Democracy”; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg, “How 
much democratic backsliding?” 
16 Linz, “The perils of presidentialism.” 
17 Linz, “The breakdown of democratic regimes”; Linz, “The perils of presidentialism”; Linz and Valenzuela, 
“The failure of presidential democracy” 
18 Kaufman and Haggard, “Democratic decline in the United States: What can we learn from middle-income 
backsliding?” 
19 E.g. Linz, “The perils of presidentialism”; Cheibub, Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. 
20 E.g. Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: The difficult combination”; Bernhard, 
Nordstrom, and Reenock, “Economic performance, institutional intermediation, and democratic survival”; 
Riggs, “Presidentialism versus parliamentarism: Implications for representativeness and legitimacy”; Svolik, 
“Which democracies will last? Coups, incumbent takeovers, and the dynamic of democratic consolidation.” 
21 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus 
presidentialism.” 
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response, scholars and practitioners often promote parliamentarism to strengthen democratic 
endurance, particularly in developing countries and divided societies.22 However, several 
critiques contend that the relationship is spurious, driven by presidentialism being adopted in 
countries already susceptible to democratic breakdown due to prior experiences with military 
rule23 or democratic instability.24 Other scholars warn that an uncritical embrace of 
parliamentarism in ethnically-divided countries may not produce the desired effect.25  
Recent trends suggest that attacks on democracy are often driven by a concentration 
of power in democratically elected executives. This calls for revisiting Linz’s opening 
statement, which centres on the effects of weak constraints on the executive. Empirically, the 
extent to which the executive is constrained de facto varies considerably both within and 
between systems of government. Executive aggrandizement affects both presidential and 
parliamentary systems, as the examples of Hungary and Poland currently illustrate.26 In effect, 
the phenomenon of “presidential hegemony” poses a potential risk to democratic stability 
everywhere.27 
The Linz-thesis is yet to be tested using granular data on the specific causal 
mechanism of weak constraints on the executive.26 Rather than relying solely on de jure 
institutions, the V-Dem data provides the opportunity to test this theory using measures of 
de facto powers. Our expectation is that stronger constraints on the executive by the legislature 
and the judiciary are positively associated with both a lower likelihood of autocratization 
episodes in democracies and greater resilience to democratic breakdown once such an episode 
has begun. 
Economic factors 
Since Lipset’s seminal work on the societal effects of economic development, questions about 
the links between economics and democratic stability have preoccupied the discipline.28 While 
many view Lipset as the birthplace of the modernization theory, his original focus is actually 
on democratic resilience, arguing that “the more the well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
                                                     
22 Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration; Lijphart, “Constitutional design for 
divided societies.” 
23. Cheibub, Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. 
24 Hiroi and Omori, “Perils of parliamentarism? Political systems and the stability of democracy revisited.” 
25 E.g. Wilson, “A Closer Look at the Limits of Consociationalism.” 
26 Bermeo, “On democratic backsliding.” 
27 Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, and Vairo, “Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–
2016.” 
28 Lipset, “Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.” 
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chances that it will sustain democracy” (emphasis added).29 Some tests of Lipset’s theory such 
as by Przeworski and Limongi suggest that democracies become resilient to breakdown once 
they are above a certain threshold level of income - at the time $6,000 (GNP/cap, PPP).30 
Several studies find that positive economic growth predicts democratic survival,31 but this 
may be good for the stability of any regime, including autocracies.32 Overall, the expectation 
is that a better quality of life makes people more likely to support the status quo over those 
seeking to undo the existing order. 
Indicators of economic development are now standard practice in models estimating 
democratization, democratic breakdown, and democratic survival.33 In line with the bulk of 
previous studies, we expect that higher levels of economic development will make 
democracies more resilient to experiencing an autocratization episode. Once a democracy 
selects into an episode of autocratization, we remain agnostic about the potential stabilizing 
effects of development. 
Neighbourhood effects 
Several studies provide evidence of diffusion effects across countries. This is often described 
as a “pull towards the regional mean” – or a tendency for countries “left behind” to eventually 
adapt to regional norms about institutional configurations for autocratic as well as democratic 
regimes by way of diffusion, emulation, spill-over, or demonstration effects.34 In light of the 
                                                     
29 Ibid., 75. 
30 For example, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, “Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis”; 
Przeworski et al., Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990; 
Boix and Stokes, “Endogenous democratization”; Epstein et al., “Democratic transitions”; Teorell, 
Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006. Przeworski and Limongi, 
“Modernization: Theories and facts,” 165. 
31 For instance, Gasiorowski, “Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis”; 
Gates et al., “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800– 2000”; Morlino and 
Quaranta, “What is the impact of the economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe.” 
32 E.g. Alemán and Yang, “A duration analysis of democratic transitions and authoritarian backslides”; Svolik, 
“Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation”; Feng, “Democracy, political stability and economic 
growth”; Gates et al., “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.” 
33 For example Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”; Teorell, Determinants of 
democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006; Morlino and Quaranta, “What is the 
impact of the economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe.” 
34 E.g. Brinks and Coppedge, “Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor emulation in the third wave  of democracy”; 
Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the international context of democratization”; Tansey, Koehler, and 
Schmotz, “Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival”; Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, 
“Would autocracies promote autocracy? A political economy perspective on regime-type export in regional 
neighbourhoods”; Risse and Babayan, “Democracy promotion and the challenges of illiberal regional powers: 
introduction to the special issue”; Gleditsch, All international politics is local: The diffusion of conflict, 
integration, and democratization; Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the international context of 
democratization”; Houle and Kayser, “The Two-step Model of Clustered Democratization.”; Gates et al., 
“Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.” 
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gradual nature of democratic regression during the third wave, we expect at most small 
neighbourhood effects on the probability of experiencing democratic regression. Once a 
democracy opts into an episode of autocratization, however, we hypothesize that the 
complete dismantling of democracy becomes more difficult for aspiring autocrats in more 
democratic regions. 
Previous democratic experience 
Previous experience under democracy may reinforce democratic survival through the 
“construction of solid links between the democratic institutions and society”.35 Some scholars 
suggest that the institutionalization of democratic procedures like party systems and judicial 
institutions36 helps to address “problems of monitoring and social coordination that 
complicate democratic compromise”.37 Others claim that election cycles have a self-
reinforcing, self-improving quality, altering the incentives to accept the rules of the game.38 
Indeed, everyday experiences living under democracy seem to promote democratic attitudes 
within society, making successful challenges to democracy less likely over time.39 Based on 
these findings, we expect that previous experience with democracy will decrease the 
likelihood of democratic regression. If a democracy nevertheless experiences autocratization, 
we hypothesize that countries with longer democratic histories will show a greater resilience 
to democratic breakdown. 
An episodes approach to democratic resilience 
While some partial exceptions exist,40 previous insights on democratic resilience tend to rely 
on a conceptualization of regime transitions as events, i.e. democratic breakdowns occur at a 
specific point in time and democratic survival or durability is indicated by the absence of a 
breakdown in a given year. This approach overlooks the important conceptual distinction 
between two forms of democratic resilience - the complete avoidance of autocratization 
                                                     
35 Tomini and Wagemann, “Varieties of contemporary democratic breakdown and regression: A comparative 
analysis,” 690. 
36 Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, “Regime legacies and levels of democracy: evidence from Latin America.” 
37 Reenock, Staton, and Radean, “Legal institutions and democratic survival,” 491. 
38 Lindberg, Democracy and elections in Africa, 144. 
39 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy; Persson and Tabellini, “Democratic 
capital: the nexus of political and economic change”; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, “Long-term persistence”; 
Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, “Cultural vs. economic legacies of empires: Evidence from the partition of Poland.” 
40 Erdmann, “Transition from Democracy. Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Breakdown of Democracy”; 
Ginsburg and Huq, “How to save a constitutional democracy.” 
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altogether and the ability to avert breakdown once autocratization has begun. A rich 
comparative literature suggests that democratic breakdowns are the culmination of episodes 
of autocratization – a process of regime transformation producing substantial declines in 
democracy over a sustained period. In democracies, autocratization entails intra- and inter-
elite bargaining between regime insiders and opposition forces.41 This can unfold over an 
extended period and does not always end with a complete transition to autocracy.42 Focusing 
on democratic breakdowns as events could “blind us to potentially important and 
theoretically revealing cases.”43 This is relevant today, as the world experiences a wave of 
autocratization characterized by gradual regressive reforms in many democracies whose fates 
as of yet remain uncertain.44 For these reasons, we adopt the episodes approach to studying 
regime transformation. 
Conceptualizing episodes of autocratization 
Based on Lührmann and Lindberg, we define autocratization as any “substantial de-facto 
decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy.”45 This definition is 
encompassing, allowing for autocratization to occur in both democratic and autocratic 
regimes.46 We speak of episodes of autocratization to capture periods with a definitive start and 
end date during which substantial and sustained declines in the quality of democracy take 
place.47 These transformations may be incremental and may not necessarily yield a complete 
transition between democracy and autocracy. This allows us to capture the full range of 
possibilities when it comes to democratic resilience, combining the benefits of studying 
autocratization as a process unfolding over time with those achieved through “breakdown as 
event”-models. 
 
                                                     
41 E.g. Linz, The breakdown of democratic regimes; Bermeo, Ordinary people in extraordinary times: The 
citizenry and the breakdown of democracy; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, Democracies and dictatorships in 
Latin America: emergence, survival, and fall.  
42 E.g. Tilly, Contention and democracy in Europe, 1650-2000; Epstein et al., “Democratic transitions”; Linz 
and Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-
communist Europe; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about 
uncertain democracies. 
43 Ziblatt, “How did Europe democratize?,” 326. 
44 See Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?”; Bermeo, “On 
democratic backsliding.” 
45 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?” 
46 It is also, notably, the mirror of democratization - or the substantial improvement of electoral democracy over 
a sustained period of time. See Wilson, et al. “Successful and Failed Episodes of Democratization: 
Conceptualization, Identification, and Description.” 
47 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?”; Wilson et al., 
“Successful and Failed Episodes of Democratization: Conceptualization, Identification, and Description.” 
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Figure 1. Typology of autocratization, based on Lührmann and Lindberg 
Our typology of autocratization episodes is summarized in Figure 1. Compared to 
Lührmann and Lindberg, we share their view that autocratization episodes come in two forms 
– here labelled democratic and autocratic regression. We use the more neutral term 
“regression” for terminological consistency and avoid terms like “autocratic consolidation” 
because substantial moves toward harsher authoritarianism in autocracies could also signal 
regime instability. Within an episode of autocratization, countries may move between these 
subtypes uninterrupted when an initial period of democratic regression results in a democratic 
breakdown followed by a subsequent period of autocratic regression.  
We focus our attention exclusively on democratic regression as a subtype of 
autocratization.48 Once in motion, episodes of democratic regression can have two possible 
outcomes: democratic breakdown or averted democratic breakdown. Therefore, Figure 1 
does not include democratic breakdown because it represents one of several possible 
outcomes.49 Democratic breakdown occurs when a democracy experiences a genuine 
transition into autocracy (as defined below). This possibility is indicated by the arrow for 
democratic regression crossing over into authoritarianism in Figure 1. When democratic 
breakdown is averted, cases remain on the right side of the same arrow within the democratic 
regime spectrum, similar Linz’s “re-equilibriation”.50 What happens after a democratic 
                                                     
48 Similar to Tomini and Wagemann, “Varieties of contemporary democratic breakdown and regression: A 
comparative analysis.” 
49 See Figure 1 in Lührmann and Lindberg’s “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?”.  
50 Linz, The breakdown of democratic regimes. 
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breakdown, which may entail a period of autocratic regression, lies outside the scope of this 
study. 
Operationalizing episodes of autocratization 
We operationalize episodes of autocratization using V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index 
(EDI). The EDI captures the degree to which a country observes Dahl’s institutional 
guarantees of polyarchy.51 It is based on over forty unique indicators aggregated using a state-
of-the-art Bayesian IRT model.52 We consider substantial and sustained declines to begin with 
an annual EDI drop of at least 0.01, followed by an overall decline of at least 0.10 throughout 
the episode. Autocratization is considered ongoing so long as (i) annual EDI declines 
continue for at least one out of every five consecutive years, (ii) the EDI does not increase 
by 0.03 or greater in a given year, and (iii) the EDI does not gradually increase by 0.10 over a 
five-year period. The end date of all episodes is the year the case experienced an annual 
decline of at least 0.01 after episode onset and prior to experiencing one of these three 
conditions for termination. 
We employ these coding rules to construct the Episodes of Regime Transformation 
(ERT) dataset, which identifies 293 episodes of autocratization occurring in 128 political units 
from 1900 to 2019.53 The complete ERT dataset also includes 427 episodes of 
democratization, as the mirror of autocratization, occurring in 166 political units during the 
same time period.  
The ERT builds on Lührmann and Lindberg’s operationalization of autocratization 
episodes with three modifications: First, we increase the time tolerance from four to five years 
to allow more countries to hold an election during the episode interval.54 Second, we increase 
the annual upturn threshold from 0.02 to 0.03 because face-validity checks show that the 
lower threshold55 can artificially terminate longer episodes (e.g. India 2002–2019, Turkey 
2007–2019, and Venezuela 1999–2019) due to a single year increase followed by continued 
                                                     
51. Teorell et al., “Measuring polyarchy across the globe, 1900–2017.”; Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and 
opposition. 
52 Pemstein et al., “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-
Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. 
53 We provide an R-package that replicates all episodes based on the most recent V-Dem dataset. The package 
allows for further robustness tests and has flexible parameter settings to redefine the episode data. Maerz et al., 
“Vdemdata – and R package to load, explore and work with the most recent V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) 
dataset”; Edgell et al. “Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset codebook, v1.0”. 
54 Most countries hold legislative elections every four or five years, with an average term of 4.7 years (cf. Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Parliaments at a glance: Term). 
55 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?” 
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sustained declines. Finally, we introduce an additional termination criterion based on gradual 
upward changes of 0.10 to reduce overlap with democratization episodes.56  
Driven by our motivation to explain democratic resilience as a two-stage process, we 
are the first to systematically differentiate democratic and autocratic regression within 
episodes of autocratization. To do so, the ERT dataset uses the Regimes of the World (RoW) 
classification.57 Because noise can cause some countries to jitter around the RoW cutoffs, we 
require that cases reaching the threshold for democracy hold a founding election for the 
legislature, executive, or constituent assembly before being considered a democracy.58 We 
differentiate the democratic and autocratic regression subtypes based on this modified regime 
classification. Of the 293 episodes of autocratization, 96 (38%) include a period of democratic 
regression. The remaining 157 autocratization episodes are classified as autocratic regression 
and fall outside the scope of this study. 
We are also the first to operationalize the outcomes of democratic regression using 
the episodes approach. Democratic breakdown occurs when a democratic regime through an 
episode of autocratization becomes reclassified as an autocracy. Similar to above, noise in the 
data may cause some cases to move into and out of electoral autocracy due to cut points in 
the RoW measure.59 We impose three criteria to signal a genuine democratic breakdown: (i) 
the country becomes a closed autocracy; (ii) it holds an election while being coded as an 
electoral autocracy indicating that the country is now a de facto electoral autocracy; or (iii) it 
becomes an electoral autocracy and stays that way for at least 5 years. Episodes of democratic 
regression where the regime avoided becoming autocratic before the end of the episode are 
coded as averted democratic breakdown for their outcome. Based on these criteria, 65 (68%) 
episodes of democratic regression have resulted in democratic breakdown since 1900, and 
only 19 (20%) averted democratic breakdown. This suggests that few democracies survive 
once an episode of democratic regression is underway.60  
An alternative autocratization operationalization is found in the annual Democracy 
Report and “State of the World” articles from the V-Dem Institute.61 It measures 
autocratization in a simplified manner as substantial if there is a drop of at least 0.05 on the 
                                                     
56 Wilson et al., “Successful and Failed Episodes of Democratization: Conceptualization, Identification, and 
Description.” 
57 Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg, “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the 
Comparative Study of Political Regimes.” 
58 Also see Wilson et al., “Successful and Failed Episodes of Democratization: Conceptualization, Identification, 
and Description.” 
59 Kasuya and Mori, “Better Regime Cutoffs for Continuous Democracy Measures.” 
60 In the current version, 12 episodes of democratic regression are censored because their outcome is yet 
undetermined. 
61 E.g. Maerz et al., “State of the world 2019: Autocratization Surges - Resistance Grows.” 
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Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) between the start- and end-year of a ten year period.62  While 
this approach offers a broad and easy-to-grasp operationalization suitable for the general 
audience these publications are designated for, the present episodes-based approach with 
(admittedly somewhat complex) coding decisions driven by theories from the literature on 
regime change, provides a much more rigorous foundation for research. It also allows for 
analysis of the two possible forms of democratic resilience - i.e. avoiding autocratization 
episodes altogether and averting democratic breakdown once in an episode.  
Descriptive analysis 
Figure 2 plots global trends for the two subtypes of autocratization episodes from 1900 to 
2019. In the Appendix, Figure 6 compares trends in episodes of autocratization and 
democratization from 1900 to 2019. Together, these two figures provide an update on the 
progression of the “third wave of autocratization”,63 including additional detail on the types 
of episodes within each wave. Generally, the results suggest that autocratization episodes are 
relatively uncommon, but their prevalence is increasing over time. The “third wave of 
autocratization” is particularly intense, with a record 25% of polities experiencing an episode 
of autocratization in 2017 (the sum of both types in Figure 2). Since then, the share of 
countries in autocratization episodes has declined to about 21%. This contrasts with the 
previous second wave of autocratization, which affected about 15% of the world’s countries 
at its peak in 1965. Figure 2 also suggests that the nature of autocratization is changing and 
threatens democracies more than in previous waves. Of the 96 episodes of democratic 
regression, 59 (61%) began after 1992. Apart from a few cases in the 1930s, autocratization 
in democracies is overwhelmingly a post-Cold War phenomenon.  
 
                                                     
62 The LDI aggregates V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and Liberal Component Index (LCI).  
63 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here:  what is new about it?” 
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Figure 2. Episodes of democratic and autocratic regression, 1900--2019 
The increasing share of autocratization episodes in democracies may be partially 
explained by a democratic world. At the start of the third wave of autocratization in 1993, 
41% of countries were democracies, compared to just 19% at the start of the second wave 
and 15% at the start of the first wave of autocratization. If autocratization is randomly 
“assigned” to countries, the third wave should affect a greater number of democracies than 
previous waves. However, existing theories suggest that autocratization episodes are not 
random processes but spurred by leaders, party elites, and various groups in societies.64 
Therefore, the high incidence of democratic regression in the current period may mark a new 
and more worrying trajectory for democracies than Lührmann and Lindberg suspected.  
While democratic regression has declined recently, this could be driven by a high 
fatality rate for democracy. So far, the third wave of autocratization has led to the breakdown  
                                                     
64 Linz, The breakdown of democratic regimes. 
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Figure 3. Trajectories of democratic regression episodes that ended with democratic 
breakdown. Red dots mark the start year of an episode and the red crosses mark 
the end year. Plots include the pre- and post-episode year. Number of episode by 
country in brackets. 
of an unprecedented 36 democratic regimes. As a result, 717 million people have lost access 
to democratic institutions and freedoms.65 Some of these countries (28) have continued to 
regress as autocracies, contributing to an increase in autocratic regression.66 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot the trajectories of each democratic regression episode in 
the ERT dataset differentiated by outcome. The two figures generate three insights. First, 
they reinforce the importance of taking an episodes approach to understanding democratic 
resilience. The lines for each episode show wide variation in the quality of democracy at the 
onset of democratic regression, the degree to which democracy declines throughout the 
episode, and the duration of the autocratization process. Taking democratic  
                                                     
65 We sum the population of all countries experiencing autocratization according to our definition after 1992. 
66 Three breakdowns in 2019 – Bolivia, Philippines, and Benin – are also likely to experience subsequent 
autocratic regression in the coming years. 
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Figure 4. Trajectories of democratic regression episodes that ended without democratic 
breakdown. Red dots mark the start year of an episode and the red crosses mark 
the end year. Plots include the pre- and post-episode year. Number of episode by 
country in brackets. 
survival, breakdown, or annual changes at a given point in time would obscure this variation 
and the potentially vital information from the patterns that can help explain democratic 
resilience. Second, they further illustrate the high prevalence of democratic regression in the 
most recent wave of autocratization regardless of outcome (see Appendix, Figure 6). Third, 
while the third wave poses a high risk of democratic breakdown, Figure 4 reveals that averted 
breakdown is also much more common now than in past waves of autocratization. Prior to 
1992, only five democracies undergoing an episode of autocratization managed to avert 
democratic breakdown – Australia (1917), Finland (1940), France (1965), India (1976), and 
Trinidad and Tobago (1972). Since then, fourteen others have followed suit.  
Explaining democratic resilience 
Data and empirical approach 
Following our conceptualization of democratic resilience as a two-stage phenomenon, we use 
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a Heckman selection model to estimate determinants of democratic regression and 
breakdown.67 The first “selection” stage estimates the probability that a given democratic 
country-year falls within an autocratization episode. Thus, the outcome variable equals one 
while being in an autocratization episode and zero otherwise, using a sample of democratic 
country-years within the ERT dataset (3,759 observations). The second “outcome” stage 
estimates the probability that a given year of democratic regression results in democratic 
breakdown. This model is conditional on the case being within an episode of democratic 
regression, accounting for selection bias estimated in the first stage. Thus, the outcome 
variable is coded as one for democratic breakdown and zero otherwise, with a sample of all 
country-years coded as one in the first stage (330 observations).68 To reduce concerns of 
simultaneity bias, that could arise if aspiring autocrats dismantle institutional checks and 
balances, we lag all variables (except for coups) by one year.  
We focus on a number of economic and political variables that emerge from the 
literature as prime suspects for explaining democratic resilience. First, to capture the key 
mechanism in the “perils of presidentialism”, we include two de facto measures of executive 
constraints provided by the V-Dem dataset: the judicial constraints on the executive index 
(v2x_jucon) and the legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg_legcon).69 The 
former measures judicial independence and whether the executive respects court rulings and 
the constitution. The latter indicates the degree to which the legislature and government 
agencies exercise oversight of the executive.70  Second, we include measures of inflation-
adjusted GDP per capita and economic growth from the Maddison project71 to capture level 
of economic development and economic performance, respectively. Third, to address spatial 
clustering of regimes and potential neighbourhood effects found in the literature, we include 
the average scores of V-Dem’s EDI for all other countries in the region using the tenfold 
geo-political classification scheme in V-Dem (e_regionpol).72 Finally, studies show that 
democracies in countries with a longer history of democratic rule are more likely to survive.73 
                                                     
67 Toomet and Henningsen, “Sample Selection Models in R: Package sampleSelection.” 
68 For details on our episode coding criteria, refer to the ERT codebook. 
69 Linz, “The perils of presidentialism.” 
70 While both indices are part of the Liberal Component Index, there is no overlap with the EDI that is used to 
determine the start and end of autocratization episodes. For the full list of all variables included in the two 
indices, see Coppedge et al. (V-Dem Codebook v10, 357). 
71 Bold et al., “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic 
development.” We use a five-year moving average of GDP growth to make sure our results are not driven by 
short-term fluctuations. 
72 E.g. Brinks and Coppedge, “Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor emulation in the third wave of democracy,” 
73 E.g. Svolik, “Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation.” 
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To capture past democratic experience, we draw on a recently developed measure of 
democratic stock that captures the accumulation of democratic experience over time.74  
In addition to this common set of predictors and in line with assumptions of the 
Heckman selection model, we include some additional predictors for “selection into” 
democratic regression in the first stage. First, we count the cumulative number of previous 
autocratization episodes. A large number of previous episodes should be indicative of a high 
general vulnerability to democratic regression. Second, as evidenced from the descriptive 
analysis above, regime transformations unfold in global waves. Therefore, we account for the 
percentage of countries with ongoing democratization and autocratization episodes for each 
year. Third, we include region dummies in the first stage to control for unobserved time-
invariant factors at the regional level that affect autocratization.75 These additional selection 
variables are only included in the first stage of the model to satisfy the exclusion restriction. 
We argue that these variables determine whether a country is more likely to autocratize, for 
instance, if it is hit by a global wave of autocratization, but that they are substantively 
unrelated to the outcome of the episode.  
We also control for a series of other correlates of democratic resilience. Because 
military coups are one of the main threats to democracy,76 we control for the occurrence of 
one or more military coups in a country (binary indicator) by combining information from 
two coup datasets included in V-Dem (e_pt_coup and e_coups).77 We also include population 
size from the Maddison project78 as it might affect a polity’s susceptibility to conflict and 
democratic regression. In the second stage, we control for the duration of the episode by 
including the number of years since episode onset and its square term, as shorter or longer 
episodes may be more prone to breakdown.79 We include decade dummies in both stages of 
the model to account for global shocks such as the two World Wars simultaneously affecting 
a large number of countries. Summary statistics for all variables in the analysis are displayed 
in Table 2 (full sample) and Table 3 (episodes sample) in the Appendix. 
 
                                                     
74 Edgell et al., “Democratic Legacies: Using Democratic Stock to Assess Norms, Growth, and Regime 
Trajectories.” 
75 Due to the low number of observations in the second stage, we cannot include region dummies in the second 
stage. 
76 Marinov and Goemans, “Coups and democracy.” 
77 Powell and Thyne, “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset”; Przeworski et al., Political 
Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) Data Set. 
78 Bold et al., “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic 
development.” 
79 The second stage is similar to a regular duration model, which is why we add a variable for the duration of 
the ongoing episode as well as its squared term. 
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Table 1. Main results: Heckman-style selection model 
  
Dependent variable in selection equation: democratic regression. 
Dependent variable in outcome equation: democratic breakdown. 
Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels *** 
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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Results 
The results are summarized in Table 1. The left column shows the probit regression 
coefficients for the first stage of the model (selecting into a democratic regression episode).  
 
In line with our expectations regarding institutional checks and balances, the results 
demonstrate that greater legislative and judicial constraints on the executive are associated 
with a decreased probability of experiencing democratic regression. The results also support 
the hypothesis that a higher level of economic development is linked to significant reductions 
in the likelihood of experiencing an episode of democratic regression. Economic 
performance, however, does not show a statistically significant effect. While regional levels 
of democracy and democratic stock display the expected negative coefficient, their effect is 
not statistically significant in the first stage of the model. We can thus corroborate the 
relevance of political and economic factors in explaining resilience to democratic regression. 
Among the selection variables included in the first stage, we see that previous autocratization 
episodes make democracies more prone to experience democratic regression and a higher 
percentage of democratizing countries globally decreases the likelihood of democratic 
regression.  
The right column of Table 1 shows the results for the outcome stage of the model. 
Most variables show results similar to the first stage. Judicial constraints on the executive 
significantly reduce the likelihood of breakdown, while the effect for legislative constraints 
on the executive is not significant in the second stage. The importance of different institutions 
varies over the course of democratic regression. Judicial institutions act as the last bulwark 
against democratic breakdown. Our results further show that economic development and 
growth do not offer much explanation for why some democracies break down and others do 
not. However, higher levels of democratic stock and quality of democracy in neighbouring 
countries significantly reduce the chance of regime breakdown. 
We simulate predicted probabilities for ongoing democratic regression episodes (first 
stage) and democratic breakdown (second stage) based on our model estimates and plot them 
over the range of the key independent variables in Figure 5. The plots on the left show how 
the probability of experiencing democratic regression varies with increasing legislative and 
judicial constraints on the executive and GDP per capita. Country-years where the de facto 
constraints on the executive are greater, are much less  
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of being in an episode of democratic regression (left panel) 
and democratic breakdown (right panel) over the range of selected explanatory 
variables. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are based on simulations from 
the model parameters. 
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likely to be followed by an episode of democratic regression. At low levels of executive 
constraints, there is a 10% chance that democratic regression occurs, while the chances are 
almost zero with tight constraints.  
The relationship between economic development and episode onset is even more 
pronounced. Democracies at the lower end of the income distribution like Niger or Liberia 
face a considerable risk of experiencing democratic regression whereas this almost never 
occurs in very rich countries. A comparison of the plots on the left and right underlines the 
usefulness of separating ongoing episodes and episode outcomes. While legislative and 
judicial constraints make onset less likely, only judicial constraints are related to a lower 
likelihood of democratic breakdown conditioned on that a democratic regression began. 
We report a series of robustness tests in the Appendix. First, we run separate models 
for episode onset and outcome. We argue that democratic regression is a phenomenon 
potentially unfolding over several stages and years. However, the Heckman model does not 
properly model episode onset; it merely distinguishes countries with ongoing episodes from 
those that do not experience democratic regression. Therefore, we run an event history model 
(Model 2 in Table 4) in which we exclude all ongoing episode-years and add polynomials for 
time since last democratic regression (or initial democratic transition). The results for episode 
onset are highly comparable to the first stage of our selection model and corroborate that our 
main independent variables are valid predictors of episode onset.80 
Second, we rerun our main model including all components of the executive 
constraints indices as separate predictors to test if certain sub-components are particularly 
influential (Model 4 and Model 5 in Table 5). Only indicators for executive respects 
constitution and legislature questions officials are significantly associated with a lower 
likelihood of experiencing autocratization. The results for all other variables remain 
unchanged. 
Third, our operationalization of episodes depends on several, arguably idiosyncratic 
choices regarding how to identify start and end dates of episodes. While we have chosen 
theoretically motivated default parameters, we run additional models where we modify 
these.81 For Model 7 in Table 6, we reduce the threshold to avert democratic breakdown in 
one year from 0.03 to 0.02 in line with Lührmann and Lindberg. For Model 8, we lower the 
threshold for total decline to 0.05. The results corroborate our initial results.  
                                                     
80 Model 3 (Table 4) is a probit model of the second stage of our selection model with similar results even 
when ignoring the selection process. 
81 Our accompanying R package makes it easy for the user to operationalize episodes according to his or her 
own criteria. 
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A more general challenge is the small number of episodes. Thus, including a large 
number of explanatory variables can be problematic, as can the exclusion or inclusion of 
influential episode cases. However, our main findings are robust to different modelling 
choices and operationalization of autocratization episodes. Executive constraints are 
consistently associated with a lower likelihood of democratic regression and democratic 
breakdown. While economic development can prevent democratic regression, it cannot 
explain why some countries break down while others do not. By contrast, countries with 
more democratic stock and higher levels of democracy in their neighbourhood are less likely 
to see democratic breakdown. 
Conclusion 
The world is currently experiencing a third wave of autocratization characterized by the 
gradual erosion of democratic norms and executive aggrandizement.82 Yet, existing 
quantitative studies of democratic resilience typically operationalize democratic breakdown 
as events. This disregards conceptual and empirical differences between those democracies 
that never experience autocratization and those that having begun autocratizing somehow 
manage to avert breakdown. This naturally leads to questions about selection bias, especially 
if factors influencing the experience of an autocratization episode are correlated with the 
outcome of the episode itself. This means that our existing theories remain incomplete until 
we account for the two-stage nature of democratic resilience.  
Thus, this article expands our understanding of democratic resilience by taking an 
episodes approach to studying autocratization. Such an approach enables us to fully account 
for the two forms of democratic resilience by conceptualizing autocratization as a process 
with defined beginning, end, and outcome. Thus, democratic resilience can be analysed in 
two stages – either by avoiding democratic regression altogether or, once it has started, by 
avoiding a full breakdown. To do so, we develop the ERT dataset, the most comprehensive 
identification of episodes of autocratization from 1900-2019, along with an R-package 
enabling many varied analyses of the phenomena. This includes a refined empirical 
delineation of democratic regression episodes allowing for a distinction between cases in 
which democracy broke down from those in which breakdown was averted.  
                                                     
82 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?”; Bermeo, “On 
democratic backsliding.” 
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Through our descriptive analysis, we demonstrate that for democracies, 
autocratization episodes are overwhelmingly a post-Cold War phenomenon. Of the 96 
episodes of democratic regression in the ERT dataset, 59 (61%) began after 1992. Thus far, 
the third wave of autocratization has led to the breakdown of 36 democratic regimes, an 
average of 1.33 per year.83 Never before has the world witnessed such a high fatality rate for 
democracy. This suggests that the current third wave of autocratization has an extraordinary 
effect on democracies.  
Results from the explanatory models provide insights into how democracies can be 
resilient to this wave of democratic regression. In particular, how democracies prevail is partly 
a function of institutions, economics, and the political environment. However, these factors 
have different effects depending on the stage of the process. Both, legislative and judicial 
constraints, for example, are associated with a decreasing likelihood of experiencing 
democratic regression. Yet, once democratic regression is ongoing only judicial constraints 
matter for averting democratic breakdown. This suggests that legislatures may be more 
affected during the early stages of democratic regression, to the point of being obsolete as 
bulwarks safeguarding democracy by the time breakdown occurs. By contrast, judicial 
institutions may play an important role as democracy’s last line of defence. The findings also 
suggest that economic development is associated with a reduced likelihood of undergoing 
democratic regression but has little influence on the outcome once an episode has begun. 
Instead, to avert breakdown once democratic regression is ongoing, the results of this study 
suggest that having democratic neighbours and long previous democratic experiences are key. 
This study further underscores the need for more holistic research on the changing 
role of structural factors in different stages of regime transformation. For practitioners in 
democracy promotion and pro-democracy activists, the spectre of autocratization requires 
different responses depending on whether the process has already begun. Only then can 
democracies prevail.  
  
                                                     
83 As compared to 0.73 per year in the first wave and 0.21 per year in the second wave of autocratization. 
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